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CHAPTER 7 
Commercial Law 
ALFRED I. MALESON 
§7.I. Consumer credit: Disclosure of interest rate. Interest rates 
in Massachusetts, with very few exceptions, have no statutory limita-
tions. The exceptions include all loans of under $1000, which have 
long had a maximum interest rate of 18 percent per year;l loans as 
high as $1500, which are regulated if made by persons in the business 
of making such loans;2 and loans by licensed pawnbrokers, which are 
regulated despite the amount of the loan.s In 1959, regulation of 
still another - and rather curious - type of loan was added to the 
list of those subject to regulation. This, in general, is a loan of over 
$1500 secured by a mortgage (other than a first mortgage) of real estate 
having an assessed value of not over $25,000, if the real estate is used 
as a home by the borrower.4 Whatever might have been the evil that 
prompted this curious conglomeration of requirements, the protection 
was twofold: limitation of interest to I Y2 percent per month and 
compulsory disclosure of the rate of interest actually charged. The 
civil penalty for overcharge of interest is simply to reduce the interest 
to 18 percent per year, but for failure to disclose the rate of interest, 
the penalty is forfeiture of the right to collect interest. 
In Remy v. Sher}> the Supreme Judicial Court has practically elimi-
nated the disclosure requirement. The note involved in the case 
showed that the principal sum was $4500, the rate of interest "or its 
equivalent in money" was $2356.80, the period of the loan was sixty 
months, and the monthly payments were $114.28. By the use of com-
plicated formulas or prepared tables it could be established that the 
rate of interest was actually IY2 percent per month, as permitted by 
the statute. The borrower maintained, however, that the purpose of 
the disclosure requirement was to make it unnecessary for him to make 
computations to determine the rate of interest, and that the disclosure 
requirement therefore is not met by a statement of the total interest 
for the entire life of the loan. The stautory limitation of the "rate of 
interest" is " ... an amount equivalent to one and one-half per cent 
ALFRED I. MALESoN is Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law School. 
§7.I. 1 G.L., c. 140, §90. 
2Id. §96. 
SId. §72. 
4Id. §§90A·90E. See 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§6.11, 9.4. 
1\ 1146 Mass. 471, 194 N.E.2d 106 (19611), also noted in §2.5 supra. 
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a month computed on unpaid balances."6 Certainly the only rate 
commonly understood is a rate per month or per year, and it is only 
when the rate is expressed according to such a standardized period that 
the borrower has any real basis for comparison. In view of this, the 
total interest for the life of the loan is somewhat meaningless. Never-
theless, the statute requires disclosure of the rate of interest or its 
equivalent in money, and the Court held that the total interest for the 
life of the loan is the equivalent in money of the rate. If there was a 
purpose to be served by disclosure of the rate of interest, that purpose 
has been largely denied by this decision. 
The Court reached its decision partially because of a statutory right 
given to the borrower to request a receipt after any payment, showing 
the application of that payment to principal and interest. "Such a 
provision," said the Court, "would be wholly unnecessary if ... such 
information must be included in the note in the first place."7 Despite 
this broad statement, it must be recognized that practically all banks 
that make mortgage loans routinely do provide such receipts, whether 
or not demanded, even though the rate of interest per month or per 
year is stated. Far from being "wholly unnecessary," this procedure is 
often of great interest and value to the borrower. 
The ambiguity which made possible the Court's emasculation of the 
statute was a result of its very inept wording, which defines the "rate of 
interest" as an "amount equivalent to" a stated percentage of unpaid 
balances. It would seem almost as if the General Court had been 
trying to prevent monotony in ignoring all previous examples, found 
in other portions of the General Laws, which express the rate of 
interest in the following ways: "six dollars on each hundred for a 
year";8 eighteen per cent per annum";D "six dollars upon each one 
hundred dollars for a year";10 and "eight dollars per one hundred 
dollars per year,"l1 With all of these examples expressing the rate of 
interest as either a percentage per year or a number of dollars for each 
one hundred dollars per year, it seems peculiar that the newer statute 
should define the term not as a percentage of the unpaid balance, but 
rather as an amount equivalent to such percentage of the balance. 
The words seem to have been taken out of context from General Laws, 
Chapter 140, Section 100, which limits the total amounts collected 
for interest and expenses by a licensee under the Small Loans Act, 
over the life of the loan, to "an amount equivalent to the maximum 
monthly rate computed on unpaid principal balances," 
§7.2. Commercial paper: Holder in due course. In order to en-
force a negotiable instrument against an obligor who was induced to 
6 Emphasis supplied. 
734& Mass. 471, 475. 194 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1963). 
8 G.L., c. 107, §3. 
DId .• c. 140, §90. 
10Id. §11I. 
11 Id., c. 255. §14. This section concerns finance charges in the retail installment 
sale of motor vehicles. Thou8h this is not "interest," ,there is a similarity. 
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sign the instrument by fraud, the holder of the instrument must be a 
holder in due course. This requires him to have taken the instru-
ment for value, in good faith, and without notice of certain facts.! 
Two cases during this 1964 SURVEY year involved these requirements, 
one focusing on "value" and the other on "notice." 
The defendant in Univer~C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Ingel; had signed 
a promissory note for the installatIOn of aluminum siding on his house 
but claimed that there was either fraud or a breach of warranty in 
the transaction. The note had been purchased by the plaintiff cor~ 
poration after it had obtained a credit report disclosing that there had 
been numerous complaints to the Boston Better Business Bureau. about 
the advertising methods of the payee of the note, the firm that sold 
and installed the siding. The Supreme Judicial Court held that this 
report had been properly excluded from evidence in the jury trial 
before the Superior Court, since it could not rebut the prima facie 
evidence that the plaintiff had taken the note without notice of a 
defense. (This prima facie, evidence consisted of a finding for the 
plaintiff in a prior trial in a district court.) "[T]he standard of notice· 
contemplated ... ," said the Court, "is actual notice and not merely 
reasonable grounds for belief. . .. [T]here was nothing in this evi-
dence by which knowledge of any fraud could be imputed to the 
plaintiff."8 
The legislature in 1961 enacted a statute requiring notes given for 
the purchase of consumer goods to be non-negotiable so that defenses 
of this type would be available to the consumer regardless of the good 
faith or lack of notice of the finance company that later purchased the 
note." Although this statute was not involved because the transaction 
had occurred before its enactment, it would not have affected notes 
given in connection with this type of home-improvement contract. 
"Consumer goods" are defined by the statute as "tangible personal 
property used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or 
household purposes." A contract for the installation of siding, while 
it involves the passage of title to the siding, ought to be regarded as a 
contract for "work and labor" rather than for the "sale of tangible 
personal property." Therefore, it would not seem to fall within the 
protection of this statute. 
The definition of the value for which a holder must take a negotiable 
instrument in order to become a holder in due course was changed 
substantially by the Uniform Commercial Code. "Value" is no longer 
synonymous with "consideration." A holder takes for value to the 
extent that the agreed consideration has been performed. II He may, 
in this way, be a holder in due course for part of the promise on an 
§7.2. ! G.L., c. 106, §3-302. 
21964 Mass. Adv. Sh 367,196 N.E.2d 847. 
8Id. at 372,196 N.E.2d at 852. 
<I G.L., c. 255, §12C. See also 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §6.6. 
5 G.L., c. 106, §3-!103(a). Value also consists of several other things not involved 
in the case under discussion. 
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instrument while subject to defenses as far as the balance of the obliga-
tion is concerned. 
The theory behind this change would seem to be that if the holder 
learns of a defense, or if the instrument is dishonored before the agreed 
consideration has been performed fully, he does not need the protec-
tion afforded a holder in due course since he may simply refuse to 
perform further himself, and he will have an excuse for non-perform-
ance. A striking example of the application of this change is given in 
the case of Korzenik v. Supreme Radio, Inc.6 The defendant was the 
obligor on a time instrument that had been obtained by fraud of the 
payee. The payee negotiated the instrument to the plaintiff, an at-
torney, as a retainer for legal services. The instrument matured one 
week after the plaintiff's services had been retained and before any 
actual services had been performed. The Supreme Judicial Court 
held that the plaintiff's recovery on the instrument depended upon 
the purpose of the retainer. If it was for the services that were to be 
performed, there could be no recovery since no services had been per-
·formed prior to the maturity of the instrument. If the retainer was 
payment for the availability to perform services rather than for the 
performance itself, there could be recovery to the extent of the value 
of that availability to the time of maturity of the instrument. Since 
the burden of proving value is on the holder, and since the plaintiff 
did not offer any evidence of the value of his availability to perform 
services for one week, recovery was denied in toto. 
§7.3. Commercial paper: Sum certain. For an instrument to be 
negotiable, it must contain a promise or order to pay a sum certain.1 
While many courts in the past have confused ambiguity with un-
certainty,2 the Supreme Judicial Court has indicated that when 
ambiguities have been resolved, uncertainty disappears. The note in 
question in Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Ingel3 contained the 
expression "with interest after maturity at the highest lawful rate." 
The General Laws, however, expressly refuse to set a "lawful rate" of 
interest except for specified cases which did not apply to the note 
before the Court. At the same time, the General Laws provide that 
the rate of interest will be 6 percent unless some other rate is agreed 
upon in writing.' As an agreement for "the highest lawful rate" 
cannot be an effective agreement for any specific rate under these 
circumstances, the statutory provision for interest at the rate of 6 per-
cent must apply; and, since the ambiguity has been resolved by resort 
to this statute, the promise can be said to be for a sum certain. 
The Attorney General and the Massachusetts Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws submitted a brief amici curiae containing an 
61964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 595, 197 N.E.2d 702. 
§U. 1 G.L., c. 106, §5-104(1)(b). 
2 See Britton, Handbook of the Law of Bills and Notes 85-85 (2d ed. 1961). 
31964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 567, 196 N.E.2d 847, also noted in §7.2 supra. 
'G.L., c. 107, §5. 
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unusually complete analysis of this aspect of the case, in order to try 
to obtain a decision consistent with a principle of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code that ambiguities should be resolved. The mere presence 
of ambiguities ought not simply to vitiate obligations. 
§7.4. Commercial paper: Proof of signatures. In order to prove 
that he is a holder in due course, one must prove not only that he 
took the ~nstrument for value, in good faith, and without notice, 
but also that he is a "holder." To be a "holder," one must be in 
possession of the instrument, and the instrument must contain all 
endorsements that were necessary to its negotiation. 1 Since an un-
authorized signature is inoperative as the endorsement of the 
person whose name is signed, it may be necessary for the person 
claiming to be a holder to establish2 that all signatures necessary 
to his chain of title are authorized. 
The steps in this process are set out rather clearly in the Uniform 
Commercial Code.s Signatures not specifically denied in the plead-
ings are admitted. If the effectiveness of a signature is contested, 
the burden of establishing it is on the party claiming under it, but 
he is aided by a presumption that it is authorized, and he need 
introduce no evidence to meet his burden unless and until opposing 
evidence that would support a finding of lack of authority is intro-
duced.4 
The operation of these rules is well illustrated by Watertown 
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Spanks.1! A note payable to the 
order of "Greenlaw & Sons Roofing & Siding Co." bore the endorse-
ment "Greenlaw & Sons by George M. Greenlaw." Despite this dis-
crepancy and the fact that the effectiveness of this signature was 
put in issue, the Supreme Judicial Court held that it was not necessary 
for the holder of the note to introduce any evidence of genuineness 
or authority for the endorsement, since the maker of the note had 
not introduced any evidence to show that Greenlaw & Sons and 
Greenlaw & Sons Roofing & Siding Co. were not the same company. 
The presumption of authority therefore required a finding for the 
holder. 
The identity of the person rather than the name used determines 
the effectiveness of the endorsement. If an instrument is payable 
to a person under a name other than his own, an endorsement in 
either that name or his own is effective as an endorsement.6 While 
the Uniform Commercial Code gives a person paying an instrument 
the right to require signatures in both names, so that he would 
not be in default for failure to pay if such a demand were refused, 
the implication of the Spanks decision is that the right does not 
§7.4. 1 C.L., c. 106, §1-201(20). 
2Id. §11-404. The term "establish" is used rll'therthan "prove." 
sId. §!I-1I07. 
4Id. §1-201(1I1). 
I! 1146 Mass. &98.1911 N.E.2d 111111 (19611). 
6 C.L., c. 106. §1I-201l. 
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extend to signatures of prior transferors. Thus, although the maker 
may be able to demand that the last holder sign both in his own 
name and in the name appearing on the instrument, he must 
accept prior endorsements as they appear if in fact they have been 
made by the proper persons. Furthermore, he must introduce 
evidence that the actual signer and the proper person are not the 
same before the presumption that they are needs to be supported. 
§7.5. Commercial paper: Accommodation parties. The Uniform 
Commercial Code provides indirectly that an accommodation party 
will have the benefit of any defense that may exist under the law 
of suretyship whenever the owner of the instrument is not a holder 
in due course; and, in addition, ~e will even have the benefit of 
suretyship defenses vis-a.-vis a holder in due course if the holder in 
due course has notice of the accommodation. l Such a defense might 
be that the instrument was diverted to a purpose different from that 
for which the accommodation party agreed to lend his name. It 
may also be the release of a party against whom the accommodation 
party has a right of recourse, or the impairment of collateral given 
by a party against whom the accommodation party has a right of 
recourse, even though the right of recourse is not disclosed on the 
face of the instrument. Thus, if one of two co-makers signs an instru-
ment for the accommodation of the other, he will have a right of 
recourse because of the contract of accommodation, although this is 
not apparent on the face of the instrument.2 The consequence of this 
is that he will be released despite his signature as a co-maker if 
collateral given by the other maker is impaired by the holder of the 
instrument. 
In Rose v. Homsey,S the defendant had signed a note as co-maker 
with her husband, for his accommodation, and this accommodation 
was known by the payee. The husband executed a mortgage on 
real property as security for the note, but the payee, at the husband's 
request and without the knowledge Of the defendant, did not record 
the mortgage. The husband subsequently became bankrupt, and 
the mortgaged property went to the trustee in bankruptcy despite 
the mortgage because of the lack of recording necessary to perfect 
the security interest. Although the Supreme Judicial Court recog-
nized that the failure of the creditor to record the mortgage was 
an impairment of collateral that would release a surety under the 
law of suretyship, it was unable to allow this defense to the defendant 
wife. The note had been executed before October I, 1958, the 
effective date of the Uniform Commercial Code, and under the 
prior Negotiable Instruments Law, as interpreted by various Massa-
chusetts cases, the obligation of a maker was absolute whether or 
not he had signed for accommodation. The rules of the Code seem 
clearly to be superior to those of the prior law. The discharge of 
§7.5. 1 G.L., c. 106, §1$-415(1$). 
2Id. §1$-606(I)(a), (b). 
S 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 5l15, 197 N.E.2d 601$. 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1964 [1964], Art. 10
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1964/iss1/10
§7.7 COMMERCIAL LAW 65 
parties is now governed by underlying relationships rather than 
by the label of "primary party" or "secondary party." 
§7.6. Sales: Consignment as sale or return. Since 1845, entrusting 
of goods to an agent or factor with even a limited authority to sell 
has given the agent the power to convey a good title to a bona fide 
purchaser in any sale even though the limitations on the agent's 
power may be exceeded. I Since 1849 such an agent has had the 
additional power to pledge his principal's goods for new advances 
(although not as security for an antecedent debt) even if this violates 
the agent's agreement with his principa1.2 The Uniform Commer-
cial Code cuts further into the right of a principal to retain control 
over goods which he entrusts for sale to an agent by providing that 
if the agent maintains a place of business at which he deals in goods 
of the kind involved in a name other than that of his principal, 
then the agent's creditors may have recourse to the goods as if they 
had been purchased by the agent under a contract of sale or return.s 
The principal's interest in the goods may be protected against these 
creditors if he complies with any applicable law providing for the 
posting of a sign (although there is no such law in this Common-
wealth); or if the agent is generally known by his creditors to be 
substantially engaged in selling the goods of others; or if the 
principal files a financing statement, in accordance with the article 
on secured transactions.4 
The Supreme Judicial Court held, in General Electric Co. v. Pettin-
gell Supply Co.," that this section of the Commercial Code means what 
it says. General Electric had delivered substantial quantities of indus-
trial lamps on consignment, as an agent to sell or distribute, to a dealer 
in various types of electrical merchandise. When the dealer later 
made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, the assignee's interest 
in these lamps had priority over the interest of General Electric. 
While General Electric raised numerous objections to this application 
of the Commercial Code by attempting to construe various words 
of the statute in an overly technical manner, the Court disposed of 
all of the objections by applying the statute as it apparently was 
intended to be applied. Consignors who want to be protected 
against creditors of their merchant-agents in the future will simply 
have to take the trouble of filing financing statements. 
§7.7. Sales: Warranties. Carlo Bianchi 0- Co. v. Builders' Equip-
ment 0- Supplies Co. I involved the acquisition by a contractor of 
a conCrete batching plant from an equipment supplier under a 
"rental contract" running for thirty months, with an option to pur-
§7.6. 1 G.L., c. 104, §l. 
2Id. §§4, 5. 
8Id., c. 106, §2-326(3). 
4 Under Section 9-102(2), a consignment intended as a security is governed by 
Article 9 of the Code. 
II 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 967,199 N.E.2d 326. 
§7.7. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 973, 199 N.E.2d 519. 
• 
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chase at any time for the remaining rental payments. While this 
transaction was in form a lease, its effect was that of a conditional 
sale, and the Supreme Judicial Court properly treated it as such. In 
preliminary negotiations between the parties, the seller (or lessor) 
represented orally to the buyer that the plant would batch one and 
three-eighths cubic yards of concrete in forty-five seconds. The written 
rental contract, however, contained no statements about performance 
of the equipment. Although the parol evidence rule forbids intro-
duction into evidence of prior representations if a contract is reduced 
to writing, the Court held that the rental contract, which was con-
cerned solely with the method of payment, did not purport to be the 
complete contract. Accordingly, the buyer was permitted to show 
by evidence of the oral statements that there was an express warranty 
of this performance. 
Since the transaction involved had occurred before the enactment 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, the Code rules were not applied. 
Had the Code been in effect, the result would have been precisely 
the same since the Code expressly permits evidence of additional 
terms to a written contract if the contract was not intended to be a 
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.2 
In addition to this 'express warranty, the Court found that the 
buyer had made known the purpose for which he wanted the equip-
ment and relied upon the seller's skill and judgment in furnishing 
equipment that would perform continuously for eight-hour periods. 
Although the equipment had a trade name, and although the Uniform 
Sales Act stated that there could be no warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose in the sale of an article under its trade name,8 
the Court nevertheless held that this section did not apply if the 
buyer relied upon the seller's recommendation rather than on the 
trade name. The Commercial Code would not only agree with this 
conclusion, but it would also make it a little easier to reach. The 
principal element of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular 
purpose is reliance upon the seller's skill and judgment. The Code 
makes no mention of trade names, so that the mere existence of a 
trade name could never result in the denial of this warranty. A 
determination must be made in every case whether the buyer relied 
upon the trade name or upon the seller. 
Having found the existence of these warranties, and having deter-
mined that they were breached, the Court awarded as damages the 
additional expenses that the buyer had incurred in performing the 
contracts for which the equipment had been acquired. Although 
the usual measure of damages for defective goods which have been 
accepted is the difference in value between the goods as they were 
and conforming goods,4 the Commercial Code expressly provides 
for consequential damages including "any loss resulting from general 
2 GL., c. 106, §2·202. 
S Former G.L., c. 106. §17(4). 
4 G.L., c. 106, §2-714. 
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or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the 
time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reason-
ably be prevented by cover or otherwise."11 Thus, this result also 
would have been reached if the Code had governed the case. 
§7.8. Sales: Revocation of acceptance. In Carlo Bianchi & Co. v. 
Builders' Equipment & Supplies CO.I the contractor who had pur-
chased equipment for the performance of two specific jobs used the 
equipment for those jobs even though the equipment failed to comply 
with express and implied warranties of performance. During this 
time he made no payments, and he complained to the seller a number 
of times. Both the buyer and seller made substantial efforts to get 
the equipment to perform as warranted, but their efforts were fruit-
less. After completing the jobs for which he had purchased the 
equipment, the buyer notified the seller that he would not accept 
the equipment. The Supreme Judicial Court held that while con-
tinued use ordinarily constitutes acceptance, ,the use in these ci!cum-
S!~~~1i~.d_Q,pJy,that~ebllyer would accept if, the,!!llp.rove-
ments were effective. Nevertheless, since the buyer had recovered 
'fiiS::iletttftI:'itdcflnonliF expenses in his action for breach of warranty, 
and since the breach by the seller was not intentional, the Court 
held that the seller was entitled to the reasonable value of the use 
of the equipment by way of restitution. 
If the Uniform Commercial Code had controlled the case, some 
new concepts would have been introduced. Under the Code rule, a 
buyer may reject goods if they fail to conform to the contract in any 
respect.2 Once having accepted the goods, he may still revoke his 
acceptance if nonconformity is substantial, and if his acceptance was 
on the reasonable assumption that the nonconformity would be 
cured.8 Whether it is determined that the buyer never accepted 
the goods or that, having accepted, he revoked his acceptance after 
the attempts of the seller to cure the defects proved unavailing, the 
buyer in either case is entitled to consequential damages. But what 
of the seller's right to the reasonable value of the use of the equip-
ment? The remedies provided for a seller depend on a wrongful 
rejection or revocation of acceptance,4 and it would seem that this, 
read together with the buyer's statutory right to recover whatever 
part of the price had been paid in any case of rightful rejection or 
justifiable revocation of acceptance,1I would bar any recovery by 
the seller. Nevertheless, the reasonable value of the use of the 
equipment ought to affect the determination of the amount of 
the buyer's consequential damages. Therefore, it would seem logical 
that the recovery which was allowed the seller in this case would, 
5Id. §2-715(2)(a). 
§7.8. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 97l1, 98l1, 199 N.E.2d 519, 526. 
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if the Code had been applicable, simply have reduced the damage 
which the buyer was found to have suffered, and for which he got 
a judgment. 
§7.9. Secured transactions: Subrogation. The priority of a per-
fected security interest over an interest in the same property perfected 
at a later date may be transferred to a new creditor by assignment 
of the interest.l In French Lumber Co. v. Commercial Realty 0-
Finance CO.,2 the Supreme Judicial Court found a means of allowing 
a new lender to succeed to the rights of a prior secured party without 
any assignment. The debtor had financed the purchase of an auto-
mobile through a security interest that was perfected by filing. The 
debtor then borrowed money from a second creditor who perfected 
a security interest in the same property by filing. After the debtor 
defaulted on the first agreement, the first creditor threatened to 
foreclose, and a third creditor advanced new funds to the debtor 
so that he could payoff the first creditor. This third creditor also 
perfected a security interest by filing. Although this third creditor's 
rights under its own security interest were subordinate to those of 
the second creditor, the Court held that the third creditor succeeded 
to the rights of the first by the doctrine of subrogation. 
Since this third creditor could have succeeded to the rights of the 
security interest of the first by getting an assignment of the interest 
when its funds were used to discharge the first debt, the Court 
found that the intervening creditor could not be prejudicially affected 
by allowing this subrogation. The Court further stated: "No pro-
vision of the Code purports to affect the fundamental equitable 
doctrine of subrogation."8 Under the circumstances the Code spe-
cifically provides that the principles of law and equity shall supple-
ment its provisions.4 
§7.IO. Banks and banking: Conversion of co-operative banks. 
The Chicopee Falls Co-operative Bank, a "tiny, pitifully inadequate 
bank ... in danger of closing its doors,"l had an opportunity to merge 
with a federal savings and loan association in another county. Such 
a merger required first the conversion of the bank to a federal 
savings and loan association; and such a conversion, though permitted 
by statute, first required the approval of the Board of Bank Incor-
poration and its finding that the conversion would, promote the 
public convenience and advantage. Although the Board of Bank 
Incorporation found that the proposed merger would promote the 
public convenience and advantage and therefore authorized the 
conversion in order to make possible the merger, the decision of 
§7.9. 1 G.L., c. 106, §9-302(2). , 
2346 Mass. 716, 195 N.E.2d 507 (1963), also noted in §2.2 supra. 
8Id. at 719, 195 N.E.2d at 5lO. 
4 G.L., c. 106, §1-lO3. 
§7.lO. 1 Chicopee Co-operative Bank v. Board of Bank Incorporation, 1964 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1103, 200 N.E.2d 284. 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1964 [1964], Art. 10
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1964/iss1/10
§7.1O COMMERCIAL LAW 69 
the Board was set aside by the Supreme Judicial Court at the 
instance of other co-operative banks. 
The Court held that the Board's order, though in form an approval 
of a conversion and within its statutory power, was, in fact, an approval 
of a merger. There is no statutory authority for mergers of co-
operative banks with federal savings and loan associations, although 
there is express statutory authority for a number of other types of 
bank mergers. Furthermore, extensive legislative history indicated 
increasing resistance to true conversions, which led to the conclusion 
that approval of mergers under the guise of conversion could not 
be within any implied power of the Board. 
The legislative hostility to this type of merger seems to be based 
on a policy against branch banking across county lines - a policy 
which cannot be enforced against federal savings and loan associa-
tions. It is interesting to note that, by the Acts of 1964,2 the privilege 
of conversion of a co-operative bank into a federal savings and loan 
association has been suspended completely for two years, except for 
those banks that may have filed application for conversion before 
January 1, 1964. 
2 Acts of 1964, c. 386. 
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